Authority and authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views on authority emerging from his concept of law is this: Authority of law, authority in law and authority about law ar e one and the same thing. The conceptual problems suggested by these three different prepositions must and can be solved in one fell swoop. Kelsen's c ore view will first be probed by giving an account of what is a promising a pproach offered in a fairly early text, Das Problem der Souveranitat, namel y, what it means to 'set' or 'posit' the law. Inevitably, this leads to an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one that intends to accommodate as many Ke lsenian emphases as possible. The Grundnorm will be presented as a shield a gainst hypostatising authority. From there, some characteristics will be in ferred of the type of authority that arises from Kelsen's account of legal knowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically, authority without an author.