Soft money, hard money, strong parties

Political parties are central to current efforts to reform campaign finance in the United States. Party money constitutes approximately half of all ca mpaign funds raised at the national level. Limiting party money is, thus, i ntegral to campaign finance reform. This Article examines what might be gai ned and lost if regulations on party money are imposed. Proponents of stron ger (and better financed) parties conjecture that strong parties increase t he ability of voters to hold their representatives accountable. We find tha t such benefits are, in practice minimal. Instead, we argue that the main b enefits of party money, especially soft money, derive from the parties' cam paign activities. Soft money finances state party organizations' voter regi stration and mobilization efforts, which have substantial effects on turnou t. Reducing party money will, thus, reduce participation. The benefits of l imitations on party soft money must therefore be weighed against likely red uctions in voting that would result.