REWARD WITHOUT PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC-CONDITIONS AND THE VOTE

Authors
Citation
B. Radcliff, REWARD WITHOUT PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC-CONDITIONS AND THE VOTE, Political research quarterly, 47(3), 1994, pp. 721-731
Citations number
29
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
10659129
Volume
47
Issue
3
Year of publication
1994
Pages
721 - 731
Database
ISI
SICI code
1065-9129(1994)47:3<721:RWP-EA>2.0.ZU;2-M
Abstract
It is often suggested that voter dissatisfaction is a more important d eterminant of behavior than satisfaction. In the familiar terms of eco nomic voting, this negativity bias implies that voters are more likely to punish than reward incumbents for the status of the economy. Howev er, economic conditions affect not only how people vote but whether th ey vote, such that during periods of poor economic performance much of the public resentment toward the in-party is absorbed by abstention ( Rosenstone 1982). Thus, the impact of recession is muted by the reduce d propensity of those suffering its effects to actually vote- Given th is fact, it appears that the president' s party is more consistently r ewarded for its economic successes than it is punished for its failure s.