This paper addresses the relevance of the economic convergence hypotheses b
etween the developing and the developed world in international greenhouse g
as (GHG) emissions negotiations. The results are based on a two-region (the
OECD and the rest of the world, ROW) neo-classical growth model with exoge
nous technical progress, different technological diffusion patterns, and a
set of geophysical relationships that consider an environmental externality
linked to GHG emissions. A game framework is taken into account in the mod
el to capture the strategic interactions between agents. The outcome of the
negotiations seems indeed to depend on the economic convergence hypotheses
. Faster economic growth of the ROW countries would encourage them to furth
er mitigate carbon emissions. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights res
erved.
JEL classification: O47; Q25; Q28.