Democracy, consultation, and the paneling of disputes under GATT

Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the rol e of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are sett led beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hy potheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the sign ificance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of polit ical regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire mo re early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concession s at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to a chieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.