International trade, bargaining and efficiency: The holdup problem

Authors
Citation
M. Wes, International trade, bargaining and efficiency: The holdup problem, SC J ECON, 102(1), 2000, pp. 151-162
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN journal
03470520 → ACNP
Volume
102
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Pages
151 - 162
Database
ISI
SICI code
0347-0520(2000)102:1<151:ITBAET>2.0.ZU;2-D
Abstract
In the presence of product market imperfections and holdup, we identify all ocative and productive efficiency gains resulting from international trade. Under a bilateral monopoly in a closed economy, inefficiencies arise in bo th input and output markets. Trade in final goods has a procompetitive effe ct in the product market. This in turn triggers an increase in output, whic h raises incentives for the upstream firm to invest and helps reduce the ho ld-up problem.