The ontological constitution of bounding-judging in the phenomenological epistemology of von Bertalanffy's General System Theory

An analysis of the current presentation of boundary judgments in the Critic al Systems literature highlights a general result: that the activity of bou nding has been, implicitly or explicitly, considered as an epistemological issue. By arguing that knowledge is not produced singularly by bounding, th e paper informs this general result This, in turn, informs other results, w hich have emerged in current understanding. In particular, the paper argues (a) the reason why knowledge indeed never attains the status of "objective or right" knowledge, (b) how critique is dependent on some positing of kno wledge, and (c) the exact place where critique is actioned. von Bertalanffy 's attempted systems epistemology is considered at length because it explai ns and informs the epistemological conclusions seen to have been drawn in t he current Critical Systems literature. von Bertalanffy's attempt requires the support of Husserlian phenomenology, especially Sartre's understanding of it. This requires an in-depth discussion of the phenomenological underst anding of consciousness. Since the conclusions stem from von Bertalanffy, t he paper reconsiders the status of General System Theory in Critical System s Thinking.