Identification of a princess under incomplete information: an Amarna story

This article presents four analyses of an interaction between the middle-Br onze Age Pharaoh Nibmuarea and the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil as descr ibed in the Amarna letters (Moran [1992] The Amarna Letters, The Johns Hopk ins Universiy Press, Baltimore, Maryland). Intent on denying the Pharaoh hi s daughter in marriage, the Babylonian king was faced with the choice of se nding messengers who could ("dignitaries'') or could not identify ("non-dig nitaries'') his missing sister in the Pharaoh's court. Intent on marrying t he king's daughter, the Pharaoh was faced with the choice of showing the si ster or showing someone else. Based on the assumption of complete informati on (game 1), the analysis revealed a dominant-strategy equilibrium: Nibmuar ea shows the sister and Kadashman-Enlil sends non-dignitaries. Based on the assumption of one-sided incomplete information (Pharaoh's misperception; g ame 2), the analysis revealed that the Pharaoh had a dominant strategy of s howing the sister irrespective of whether the king is keen or reluctant to learn about his sister's fate. Based on the assumption of one-sided incompl ete information (Kadashman-Enlil's misperception; game 3), the analysis rev ealed that if non-dignitaries are sent, the Pharaoh prefers showing someone other than his sister. Based on the assumption of two-sided incomplete inf ormation (game 4), the Pharaoh finds it more beneficial to present the sist er irrespective of whether his intentions are genuine or feigned. With inco mplete information, it is difficult to judge the other's intentions; the co st of being caught cheating by not showing the sister to knowledgeable mess engers was quite high. These analyses highlight the strategic uncertainty t hat characterized this Bronze-Age interaction.