The status of mind in culturalist explanations of action. On the issue of the relation between behaviour and knowledge according to Stephen Turner and Theodore Schatzki

This article reconstructs and evaluates the recent attempts by Stephen P. T urner and Theodore R. Schatzki to clarify the status of "collective, mental knowledge" in culturalist explanations of action. The point of departure i s Turner's critique of unreflected mentalism in numerous culturalist strate gies aimed at explaining action and his recommendation of quasi-behaviorism as a countermodel. The "culture-as-text" approaches of Foucault and Geertz , on the one hand, and Schatzki's post-Wittgensteinian rheory of practices, on the other, are introduced as two theoretical alternatives which remain sceptical toward mentalism, but which in their new explanatory strategies n evertheless draw upon collective orders of knowledge. In principle, the art icles argues in favor of Schatzki's model against Turner and Foucault/Geert z, bur it pleads for a revision of Schatzki's Wittgensteinian anti-causalis m.