The intergovernmental United Nations Conference on Highly Migratory and Str
addling Stocks, initiated in 1993 and finished in 1995, addressed the conse
rvation and management of fishery resources located both within the coastal
state 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the adjacent high seas. T
hese types of marine resources continue to be a source for international co
nflicts and debates. The original United Nations Law of the Sea of 1982 fai
led to address transboundary fisheries in a proper way. In particular, the
agreement did not recognize the emergence of the complicated "straddling st
ock" issue. In the new United Nations Law of the Sea agreement of 1995, a c
onsensus was reached that the management of the straddling and highly migra
tory fish stocks should be carried out through regional fisheries managemen
t organizations. We present a review of the straddling stock issues in the
international agreement emerging from the negotiations within the United Na
tions. The review is contrasted with and clarified by game theoretic analys
es. We also discuss one international fishery exemplifying the case, the No
rwegian spring-spawning herring. The main conclusion is that the local prob
lems, faced during the stage of setting up regional fisheries organizations
for the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, are exp
ected to be much more complicated and difficult to solve as compared to the
cases of "shared fish stocks". In the current paper, we present two reason
s for this increased complexity. The first is the larger number of players
as compared to the case of "shared fish stocks" and the second is the possi
bility of new members entering the regional fisheries organizations.