The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games

Authors
Orshan, G Zarzuelo, JM
Citation
G. Orshan et Jm. Zarzuelo, The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games, GAME ECON B, 32(1), 2000, pp. 67-84
Citations number
24
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN journal
08998256 → ACNP
Volume
32
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Pages
67 - 84
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(200007)32:1<67:TBCPFN>2.0.ZU;2-W
Abstract
A bilateral consistency principle is used to generalize the Nash bargaining solution to a new NTU solution concept. It coincides with the prekernel fo r TU games and can be formulated in terms of a generalized concept of exces s. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71. (C) 2000 Acad emic Press.