In this paper we propose a philosophical distinction between biologica
l and cognitive domains based on two conditions that are postulated to
obtain a useful characterization of cognition: biological grounding a
nd explanatory sufficiency. According to this, we argue that the origi
n of cognition in natural systems (cognition as we know it) is the res
ult of the appearance of an autonomous system embedded into another mo
re generic one: the whole organism. This basic idea is complemented by
another one: the formation and development of this system, in the cou
rse of evolution, cannot be understood bur as the outcome of a continu
ous process of interaction between organisms and environment, between
different organisms, and, specially, between the very cognitive organi
sms. Finally, we address the problem of the generalization of a theory
of cognition (cognition as it could be) and conclude that this work w
ould imply a grounding work on the problem of the origins developed in
the frame of a confluence between both Artificial Life and an embodie
d Artificial Intelligence. (C) 1997 Academic Press.