Much of the literature on consumption smoothing and on risk sharing has foc
used on the ability of the household as a unit to protect its consumption.
Little is known about the ability of individual members of the household to
keep consumption smooth over time or relative to other members of the hous
ehold. We use data on adult nutrition in Ethiopia to investigate whether in
dividuals are able to smooth their consumption over time and within the hou
sehold. We find that poorer households are not able to do so. Furthermore,
poor southern households do not engage in complete risk sharing; women in t
hese households bear the brunt of adverse shocks. This result implies that
the collective model of household organization, which imposes Pareto effici
ency on allocations, is rejected for these households. Finally, we obtain e
stimates of the relative Pareto weights in household allocation. We find th
at a wife's relative position is better if customary laws on settlements at
divorce are favorable or if she comes from a relatively wealthy background
and that poor southern women have lower Pareto weights in allocation.