Dynamic service sharing with heterogeneous preferences

We consider a service system where individual users share a common resource , modeled as a processor-sharing queue. Arriving users observe the current load in the system, and should decide whether to join it or not. The motiva tion for this model is based, in part, on best-effort service classes in co mputer communication networks. This decision problem is modeled as a noncoo perative dynamic game between the users, where each user will enter the sys tem only if its expected service time (given the system description and pol icies of subsequent users) is not larger than its quality of service (QoS) requirement. The present work generalizes previous results by Altman and Sh imkin (1998), where all users were assumed identical in terms of their QoS requirements and decision policies; here we allow heterogeneous requirement s, hence different policies. The main result is the existence and uniquenes s of the equilibrium point in this system, which specifies a unique thresho ld policy for each user type. Computation of the equilibrium thresholds are briefly discussed, as well as dynamic learning schemes which motivate the Nash equilibrium solution for this system.