Network markets are characterized by composite goods or services that can b
e obtained from alternative combinations of basic products. Examples are co
mplex, multistage production and consumption systems, transport and communi
cations. Efficiency in these markets depends on the net effect of the compl
ementary and substitution relationships that exist between elementary produ
cts, which are determined by network topology and market structure. This pa
per examines factors that affect equilibria in network markets by consideri
ng a number of simple economic models of network markets. First it is shown
how network topology influences profits and welfare under different market
regimes. In particular, attention is given to price discrimination in mono
polistic networks. Next evolution of networks is examined, which may occur
via investment in new links by incumbent firms, or via entry of new firms i
n the network. It is shown that the number of competitors in equilibrium ma
y not coincide with the socially optimal one, which in turn depends on the
network structure. In order to show some concrete implications of the theor
etical results two examples are presented, dealing with intermediate factor
s in an input-output production system, and with the trade-off between netw
ork externalities and economies of scale and density in hub-and-spoke trans
portation networks.