The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the m
etatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a dist
inction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgme
nts, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing ("n
oetic feeling") occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automa
tic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the o
ther. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory tracts, noetic feeling
s are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintenti
onally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling
can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noet
ic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled actio
n, but they are also informed by feedback From the outcome of that action.
(C) 2000 Academic Press.