Feelings and judgments of knowing: Is there a special noetic state?

A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeli ng-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are n ot, however, attributable to direct access to the target-an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the d istinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that peop le base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit informat ion seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct acces s view is premature. There may be a state-a true noetic state-in which peop le actually know the answer before they are able to express. it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-acces s view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tong ue (TOT) slates. (C) 2000 Academic Press.