In Koriat's paper "The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implication
s for Consciousness and Control," he asserts that the feeling of knowing st
raddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter
into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior.
This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consc
iousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a m
onitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the contr
ol of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Furth
er, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affe
ct cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that
frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness.
Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because i
t lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that rep
resents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feel
ings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by consc
ious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for
answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling, of knowing will
not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal.
(C) 2000 Academic Press.