Is it possible, starting from Rawls but refraining from a wholesale accepta
nce of his theory, to construct a philosophy of authentic liberal pluralism
? This would be a pluralism both grounded within the reasonable political r
eason inherited from the Enlightenment and "immune" to the twofold weakness
of reason: its alleged inability to oppose abusive powers, and its alleged
incapacity to provide itself with a foundation. In the search for such a p
hilosophy, the A. suggests that we explore the anchoring of liberal reason
in what he calls the "trans-reasonable" domain, which is both internal to r
eason and other than it. He attempts to circumscribe this domain using post
modern approaches to subjectivity and ontology - and mainly those of Levina
s and Vattimo. This makes it possible to develop a philosophy of pluralism
in which reason, while remaining crucial, is nevertheless conscious of the
need to appeal to something beyond itself. This beyond is "charity", a recu
rrent theme in postmodern attempts to offer a non-foundationalist metaphysi
cs. This theme of charity appears not as a merely poetic choice, but as the
historical destiny of ontology: therefore, the trans-reasonable grounding
of reason makes it possible to think of pluralism both beyond reason and be
yond power.