This article argues that Jurgen Habermas's view of religion as anathema to
rational critical discourse reflects his misunderstanding that religion com
prises a monolithic and immutable body of dogma that is closed to reason. I
llustrative data from Catholic history and theology and empirical data gath
ered from contemporary American Catholics are used to show the weaknesses i
n Habermas's negation of the possibility of a self-critical religious disco
urse. Specifically, I highlight the doctrinal differentiation within Cathol
icism , its longstanding theological emphasis on the coupling of faith and
reason, institutional reflexivity, and the doctrinally reflexive reasoning
that contemporary Catholics us in negotiating what might appear as "contrad
ictory" identities (e.g., being gay or lesbian and Catholic). Although the
data presented take issue with Habermas's disavowal of religion the article
shows that the practical relevance of doctrinal reasoning at both the inst
itutional and the individual level vindicate Habermas's faith in the emanci
patory potential of reasoned argumentation to advance participative equalit
y.