Concomitant to the renaissance of the concept of virtue in contemporary mor
al philosophy was the return to the traditional theories of virtue. The aut
hor offers a comparison of the theories of virtue with Aristotle, Spinoza a
nd Hume, focusing on two questions: First, what do such diverse conceptions
as Aristotle's eudaimonism, Spinoza's ethical rationalism and Hume's theor
y of moral sense have in common? Her argument is, that in spite of differen
t principles and different conceptual means these conceptions could be cove
red by the same moral-philosophical tradition in which that, what ought to
be (the desired) is not strictly separated from that, what is (from man's a
ctual being). Thus the good and the virtue are not seen as divergent object
ives or two mutually alienated worlds-as the Kantian tradition later tried
to suggest. The second question concerns some of the specific incentives of
the contemporary theories of virtue, especially the concept of character a
nd its philosophical interpretation.