Holding out for a haircut: Financial crisis, moral hazard, and interest rate policy

Citation
B. Dennis et S. Kandel, Holding out for a haircut: Financial crisis, moral hazard, and interest rate policy, INT J FIN E, 5(3), 2000, pp. 233-249
Citations number
23
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS
ISSN journal
10769307 → ACNP
Volume
5
Issue
3
Year of publication
2000
Pages
233 - 249
Database
ISI
SICI code
1076-9307(200007)5:3<233:HOFAHF>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed introduction of higher int erest rates in crisis-hit economies has been criticized as being unnecessar ily contractionary. This criticism ignores the effects of interest rate pol icy on the incentives to restructure corporate debt once it has become stra tegically optimal for domestic firms to declare a state of over-indebtednes s. A widespread state of debt moratoria constitutes a 'bad' equilibrium, wh ereas the widespread adoption of a quick debt workout strategy is a potenti ally 'good' equilibrium. The latter can be encouraged through various polic ies, most controversially a short-term policy of high interest rates. Other potential policies include: (i) widespread debt forgiveness; (ii) enhanced implementation of the bankruptcy court; and (iii) the enforcement of free market competition. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.