Although the cost of banking regulation has been a controversial issue for
many years, little empirical evidence is available. This study provides new
evidence on the effect of the amount of required changes on start-up compl
iance costs, using data from a survey of the costs of implementing the Trut
h in Savings Act. The finding, that start-up compliance costs were insensit
ive to the extent of changes required to implement the regulation, has impo
rtant implications for regulatory policy. It suggests that a general requir
ement to alter an infrequent practice may impose nonnegligible costs on all
banks, not only those banks that must make substantive changes in their pr
actices. This finding argues against a policy of making frequent minor revi
sions in regulations. Instead, a policy of delaying revisions until some nu
mber have been accumulated and then making infrequent major revisions of re
gulations may reduce implementation costs by allowing banks to exploit econ
omies of changing practices.