The management of matches: A research program on solidarity in durable social relations

We outline a research program on solidarity in matches, i.e. durable social relations between two or, to generalize slightly, a few parties. Examples of matches include relations between natural persons such as households as well as "corporate actors" such as research and development alliances, or b uyer-supplier relations between firms. A typical feature of matches is that the partners are interdependent with partly common and partly conflicting interests. This interdependence induces risks. A paradigmatic risk and a cl assical example of solidarity problems is that cooperation in matches is of ten problematic: realizing the joint interests of the partners requires coo peration which is problematic due to individual incentives for opportunism. Trust problems are a typical case and the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-kno wn formal model of these risks. We discuss how rational, i.e. incentive-gui ded and goal-directed actors cope with risks, or how they manage their matc h. In particular, we highlight how the assumption of rational behavior, tog ether with assumptions on the social embeddedness of matches and transactio ns in matches, can be used to generate hypotheses on the management of coop eration problems.