Reproduction of nomative agents: A simulation study

The paper presents experiments of a simulation model of aggression control in populations of agents endowed with knowledge about others' reputation (c ompliant vs. cheaters). The reproductive advantages of different strategies of aggression control, i.e., normative (e.g., "do not attack a food-owner" ) vs, non-normative ("do not attack a stronger agent"), are compared under given circumstances (e.g., exchange of information about others' reputation ). The objectives of the model are: (a) investigate the role of social agents' internal variables (representations, rules, etc.) in the interaction betwe en social processes and agents; while the direction from agents to social p rocesses is usually a focus of attention in simulation models, the reverse one (from social processes to agents) is not; our findings seem to show tha t some normative disposition of agents is an "emergent" effect of social pr ocesses; (b) question the widely shared assumption that agents are egoist a nd all which is good in society is either an emergent effect of social life or an institutional task. Our findings seem to show that there may be an a daptive advantage in acting pro-socially.