The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company

Authors
At, C Morand, PH
Citation
C. At et Ph. Morand, The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company, ECON LETT, 68(3), 2000, pp. 287-292
Citations number
2
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN journal
01651765 → ACNP
Volume
68
Issue
3
Year of publication
2000
Pages
287 - 292
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(200009)68:3<287:TCOTVS>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
We study the role of security-voting structure when a government wants to p rivatize a company. Our results show that the one share-one vote structure is optimal for allocating control rights to the most efficient pretender. H owever, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale's reve nue. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification : D44; G34.