For more than a decade NEC dominated the Japanese PC market with its PC-98
architecture, which was incompatible both with its major Japanese rivals an
d the global PC standard. However, NEC was powerless to prevent the introdu
ction of Japanese versions of Windows 3.1 and 95 that ran on its competitor
s' architectures as well as on the PC-98, unifying the Japanese PC market a
nd creating a common set of application programming interfaces for all Inte
l-based Japanese PCs. The introduction of Windows rendered obsolete the lar
ge DOS-based software library that had provided strong positive externaliti
es for the NEC architecture. Absent those advantages, the market share of t
he PC-98 standard fell from 60% to 33% in five years, and NEC finally aband
oned the PC-98 in favor of the global standard. An examination of the unusu
al rise and fall of the PC-98 shows how victory in a standards competition
can be negated by the introduction of a new architectural layer that spans
two or more previously incompatible architectures.