This article applies two new criteria, desirability and faithfulness, to ev
aluate Peli et al.'s (1994) formalization of Hannan and Freeman's structura
l inertia argument (1984, 1989). We conclude that this formalization fails
to meet these criteria. We argue that part of the rational reconstruction o
n which this formalization builds does not reflect well the substantive arg
ument in translating the natural language theory into logic. We propose two
alternative formalizations that meet both of these criteria. Moreover, bot
h derive the inertia theorem from much weaker, so much less constraining, p
remises. While both new formalizations draw information only from the origi
nal statement of the inertia theory, they reflect two different interpretat
ions of inertia accumulation.
The two new formalizations are compatible with some recent theory extension
s in organizational ecology. However, they lead to substantially different
consequences when additional sociological considerations are added to their
premise sets. The interplay between logical formalization and sociological
content is highlighted using the example of Stinchcombe's (1965) liability
-of-newness theorem. Even modest extensions of the proposed models lead to
contrary implications about the age dependence in organizational mortality
rates. Even "faithful" logical formalizations of arguments ordinarily invol
ve implicit theory building.