A new solution to the collective action problem: The paradox of voter turnout

Macy's work offers a potential solution to the paradox of voter turnout. Th e stochastic learning theory of voter turnout (Kanazawa 1998) posits that c itizens perceive a correlation between their behavior (voting versus absten tion) and the outcome of collective action (win versus loss for their candi date), and that they interpret the outcome as a reinforcer or a punisher. T he theory can solve the paradox of voter turnout because now p, the probabi lity that one's vote is or appears decisive, equals approximately .500 in t he calculus-of-voting model (instead of p congruent to 0). I use General So cial Survey data to test the theory. The empirical results indicate that ci tizens make their turnout decisions according to the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" pattern predicted by the stochastic learning theory, especially if there a re no strong third-party candidates.