R. Nadeau et al., Elite economic forecasts, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voting intentions in Great Britain, EUR J POL R, 38(1), 2000, pp. 135-170
In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on pr
ofessional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite e
conomic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter
preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objecti
ve economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. R
eports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite
expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election-relat
ed cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election-r
elated cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass publi
c. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to n
ews coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge
the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can
be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the genera
l public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an
understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.