Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach

Authors
Sandroni, A
Citation
A. Sandroni, Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach, GAME ECON B, 32(2), 2000, pp. 157-182
Citations number
28
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN journal
08998256 → ACNP
Volume
32
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
157 - 182
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(200008)32:2<157:RACIRC>2.0.ZU;2-6
Abstract
Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restri ctions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Jo urnal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83. (C) 2000 Academic Press.