State consciousness and creature consciousness: a real distinction

It is widely held that there is all important distinction between the notio n of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, th e notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recen tly argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distincti on between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no para llel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state conscious ness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distiller prop erties. Conscious creatures can have, at one time, both conscious and uncon scious mental states. This raises the question of what distinguishes the co nscious from unconscious mental stares of a subject: a question about what state consciousness consists in. Whilst the state/creature distinction may not be of use in explaining every aspect of a subject's consciousness, it d oes provide a key part of the explanandum for theories of consciousness and mind. The state/creature consciousness distinction is a real one and shoul d nor be dropped from our psychological taxonomy.