Physicalism, qualia inversion, and affective states

I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is not a possibility we shoul d take seriously. The principle reason is that if someone's qualia were inv erted in the specified manner there is reason to believe the phenomenal dif ference would manifest itself in behaviour. This is so for two reasons. Fir st, I suggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, are partly constit uted by an affective component which would be inverted along with the conne cted qualia. The resulting affective inversions will, given the intimate co nnections that exist between emotions and behaviour, likely manifest themse lves in behaviour, in which case the underlying phenomenal differences can be functionally captured. Second, I argue that other sense modalities lack the structural features necessary for undetectable inversion which, because of their analogy with colour qualia, weakens the plausibility of such an i nversion in the original case of vision.