Did the Suez crisis mark the end of empire in Britain and France, their sub
mission to the political domination of the United States and the beginnings
of a 'new Europe'? Or did it stimulate a rethinking and reformulation of t
he meaning of empire, its utility and costs? This article argues that the '
retreat from empire' was not so much a simple, reflexive response to demand
s from below but a conscious effort by those from above to find new ways of
exploiting the opportunities that the world beyond Europe offered them. De
colonisation, it is argued, is best understood in terms of contemporary bus
iness thinking, i.e, a conscious design on the part of managers to 'downsiz
e', 'restructure', and 're-engineer' the imperial project. And, as in the c
orporate world, what might appear to the naked eye as retreat and abandonme
nt may, on closer examination, turn out to be something more ambitious, an
attempt to divest the imperial enterprise of unprofitable ventures and to r
einvigorate those that are deemed to have untapped potential.
After Suez, Britain attempted to demonstrate to the Americans that maintain
ing their access to middle eastern oil was vital both strategically and eco
nomically. They attempted to persuade them that 'Nasserism' was second only
to communism as a danger to the western alliance, to have them drop their
'anticolonialist' rhetoric and to support the Bagdad Pact. In order to comb
at the anticolonial movement they established a 'colonial' bloc at the UN.
Assuming that the Suez crisis marked the end of empire has hidden the strug
gle between Britain and France to redefine its meaning and has concealed th
e extent to which ambitious designs continued to persist in the contest to
determine the future shape of a 'united' Europe - a struggle in which neith
er the British nor the French regarded themselves as pawns of the Americans
in the Cold War, but rather one in which they attempted to move the powerf
ul new American piece around the chess board in the middle east, Africa and
Asia.