Naturalized sense data (Visual perception)

This paper examines and defends the view that immediate objects of visual p erception, or what are often called sense data, are parts of the facing sur faces of physical objects-the naturalized sense data (NSD) theory. Occasion ally defended in the literature on the philosophy of perception, most famou sly by G.E. Moore (1918-1919), it has not proved popular and indeed was aba ndoned by Moore himself. The contemporary situation in the philosophy of pe rception seems ripe for a revaluation of the NSD theory, however. The NSD t heory allows us to accommodate the very real shortcomings in uncritical dir ect realism without postulating the existence of non-physical sense data in a way that has seemed to many incompatible with any robust form of philoso phical naturalism. The argument to establish the NSD theory proceeds in two stages. In II I ar gue against the direct realist that we perceive three-dimensional material objects in virtue of perceiving parts of their surfaces. The argument for t his conclusion involves clearly distinguishing (in I) between two notions t hat have tended to be run together in discussions of perception-namely, imm ediate perception and direct perception. In III I argue against the sense-d atum theorist that those parts of the surface of those objects are not them selves perceived in virtue of the perception of anything else.