What are physical objects? (Spatial Location Account, ontological categories)

The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before . Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct an alysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly litt le attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I cons ider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for pr eferring one of them over its rivals. The account of physical objects that I recommend-the Spatial Location Account-defines physical objects as object s with spatial locations. The intuitive idea behind the Spatial Location Ac count is this Objects from all of the different ontological categories-phys ical objects; non-physical objects like souls, if there are any; propositio ns; universals; etc.-have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e. , the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects.