North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction and missiles to delive
r then, but has not been able to modernize its armed forces and its convent
ional warfare capability has deteriorated Not simply a scheme to gain inter
national aid and hard cash, the missile program has thus come to assume a s
trategic position for Pyongyang.
This article outlines the history of the missile program, takes a look at m
issile capabilities, and discusses implications such as the threat perceive
d by Japan and the United States, sales to the Middle East and South Asia,
and their value as a shield against outside pressure. Above all, they help
ensure the survival gf the Pyongyang regime. The article goes on to detail
American policy responses including TMD, conventional deterrence including
preemptive strikes (not appropriate for the Korean situation), the MTCR, an
d the negotiation track. For South Korea, the author suggests a combination
of deterrence through enhanced missile capability of its own and continued
engagement policy.
North Korea is consistent with its pattern of flexing military muscle then
demanding a price. So long as this keeps working, Pyongyang is unlikely to
dismantle its missile program. The only possible trade-off might be the com
bination of US forces withdrawal and South Korea's gradual political submis
sion-too high a price. North Korea thus will not relinquish its leverage-ba
rring a major change domestically that could possibly call for a broader pe
nce dividend but that may not be possible without a genuine reconciliation
based on peaceful coexistence.