Ad. Galinsky et al., Counterfactuals as self-generated primes: The effect of prior counterfactual activation on person perception judgments, SOC COGN, 18(3), 2000, pp. 252-280
Three experiments tested whether counterfactual events can serve as primes.
The evidence supports the hypothesis that counterfactuals prime a mental s
imulation mind-set that leads people to consider alternatives. Exposure to
counterfactual scenarios affected person perception judgments in a later, u
nrelated task and this effect was distinct from semantic construct priming.
Moreover, these effects were dependent on the availability of salient poss
ible outcomes in the person perception task. Direction of the counterfactua
l comparison, upward or downward, did not moderate any of the effects, prov
iding evidence that the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the c
ontent of the counterfactuals, was responsible for the priming effects. The
se experiments also provide evidence that the effects of mind-set accessibi
lity, similar to semantic construct accessibility, are limited by the appli
cability of the primes to the later judgments. Implications for the nature
of priming effects are discussed.