Is Habermas a transcendental thinker? The question of the possibility of rationality as a philosophical theory

In this paper, I attempt to cast some light on the debate between and Rorty on the question of the possibility of rationality as a philosophical theor y. My assessment of this debate proceeds from the perspective of their resp ective critiques of modern philosophy, defined as an epistemological discip line within the Cartesian-Kantian tradition of foundationalism. While both thinkers seem to be fairly clear on why they can no longer accept philosoph ical theories of rationality which have their roots in the metaphysical tra dition of modern philosophy, Rorty is convinced that Habermas, despite his linguistic turn, does not quite succeed in breaking with the transcendental problematic of the Kantian tradition. In what follows, I propose to invest igate the accuracy of the charge of transcendentalism levelled by Rorty aga inst Habermas.