Cultural relativism and the translatability of the cultural strange in theview of Quine and Davidson. An observation from the point of view of the social sciences

The following considerations are intended to show that some philosophical i nsights of Quine and Davidson about interpretation and translatability are also profitable for social scientists interested in the topic of intercultu ral understanding and intercultural communication. In the first part of the paper (sections II, III), a reconstruction of the problem of the "indeterm inacy of translation" (Quine) is undertaken; then a discussion of the pros and cons of the "principle of charity" (Quine and Davidson) with its implic ations far the limitation of relativism follows. In the second part of the paper (sections IV, V), the thesis is advanced th at openness of analytical philosophy toward the social sciences - an openne ss whose seeds are already present in Quine and Davidson - is one essential condition for dealing adequatly with the problem of relativism. On the oth er hand, it is argued that scepticism toward the understanding and mediatio n of cultural strangeness might benefit from Davidson's critical approach t o the idea of different and incommensurable "conceptual schemes". The topic of the convergence of analytical thinking and the social sciences, finally , is taken up again and deepened in section VI in the contest of the connec tion between language, meaning, rule, and understanding (ethnomethodology; A. Schutz). The conclusion is that the understanding and mediation of cultu ral strangeness begins in each person's own cultural community. In Quine's and Davidson's words: "radical translation begins at home."