This essay addresses the security threats to Russia as of mid-1999. Russia
at that time underwent severe internal crises linked to the firing of Evgen
ii Primakov as prime minister and the Duma's attempts to impeach President
Boris Yeltsin. The essay argues that the main threats to Russia's security,
contrary to the angry reactions to Kosovo, are internal in nature stemming
from the failure to build an effective state, control the armed force, res
olve the federal bargain in adequate fashion, or revive the economy. All th
ese factors encourage the privatization of the state where individual actor
s regard the state as a vehicle for the aggrandizement of their personal in
terests as the expense of any national interest. Indeed, Russia finds it di
fficult to define any sort of coherent national interest and cannot address
classical security threats or new transnational ones. While Russia feels i
tself threatened or rather the armed forces and political elite feel threat
ened by NATO's Kosovo campaign, the real threats are at home and the fixati
on with derzhavnost' and Russia's inherent great power status will only inh
ibit efforts to deal with real threats and further aggravate its protracted
crises.