Evolutionary models of communication are used to shed some light on the sel
ective pressures involved in the evolution of simple referential signals, a
nd the constraints hindering the emergence of signs. Error-prone communicat
ion results from errors in transmission (in which individuals learn the wro
ng associations) and communication (in which signs are mistaken for one ano
ther). We demonstrate how both classes of errors are required to generate d
iversity and subsequently impose limits on the sign repertoire within a pop
ulation. We then explore the influence of geographic structuring of a popul
ation on the evolution of a shared sign system and the importance of such s
tructure for the maintenance of sign diversity. Deceit tends to erode conve
ntional signs systems thereby reducing signal diversity, we demonstrate tha
t population structure can act as a hedge against deceit, thereby ensuring
the persistence of sign systems. (C) 2000 Academic Press.