Research on adult deductive reasoning shows that reasoning biases are not n
ecessarily rooted in faulty logic bur can stem from an attentional failure
to inhibit. Is this interpretation of deductive biases true for fifth-grade
children? Using the example of the matching bias, the aim of the present s
tudy was to show that a presumption of rationality is justified for childre
n, insofar as their biases appear to be due to faulty executive programming
like that found in adults, and not necessarily from the lack of a logical
scheme. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which
60 fifth graders were trained to inhibit the matching bias on a task deriv
ed from Wason's selection task (Tweety). Pre- and post-tests performance wa
s assessed via a task derived from a simplified version of the Evans condit
ional rule falsification task (Galaxy). The data indicated a training effec
t, suggesting that subjects traditionally labelled as "irrational" with res
pect to classical deductive logic are in fact "inefficient inhibitors". The
se findings are discussed in terms of a polymorphous view of rationality.