Veto players and institutional analysis

Authors
Citation
G. Tsebelis, Veto players and institutional analysis, GOVERNANCE, 13(4), 2000, pp. 441-474
Citations number
51
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION
ISSN journal
09521895 → ACNP
Volume
13
Issue
4
Year of publication
2000
Pages
441 - 474
Database
ISI
SICI code
0952-1895(200010)13:4<441:VPAIA>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regard less of regime ( presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This p aper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritar ian institutions; the importance ob absenteeism, or of political marginaliz ation; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for go vernment stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidenti al systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial in dependence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basi s of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corrob orating the theory is provided.