Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitutio n mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of gen etic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raise s philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by " the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' and about what sort of moral demands ari se from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference b etween dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Severa l conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conc eption: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who hav e it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is no t absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breedin g manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does rest rict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic enginee ring, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited deve lopment of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Att field, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and th e Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inhere nt value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the S wiss Constitution article.