Institutional arrangements for fisheries: alternate structures and impediments to change

The precarious state of many of the world's important commercial fisheries have called into question the ability of government agencies to carry out m andates related to stock conservation and sustainability. This paper argues that the prominent role of government agencies in building fisheries manag ement systems of the past few decades, has led to the prevalent situation t hat management is top-down and has fostered the view that these institution s are "in control". In that view, the fishing sector has generally been exc luded from management and is depicted as fundamentally irresponsible with r egard to resource sustainability. A paternal government-industry relationsh ip diminishes the opportunity for the fishing industry to become a responsi ble partner in fisheries management. We argue that institutional arrangemen ts are a major impediment to effective management change. We consider the p roblem of managing commercial fisheries under current institutional structu res by examining the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans as a case study. We outline the benefits of alternative bottom-up and participative d ecision making for fisheries and discuss the requirements for more effectiv e institutional arrangements that would empower stakeholders toward buildin g a real stakeholders-government partnership. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights reserved.