Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism

Authors
Citation
J. Stennek, Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism, EUR ECON R, 44(9), 2000, pp. 1727-1744
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN journal
00142921 → ACNP
Volume
44
Issue
9
Year of publication
2000
Pages
1727 - 1744
Database
ISI
SICI code
0014-2921(200010)44:9<1727:CIXALL>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
The main result of this study is that a financial constraint may serve as a disciplining device on the internal efficiency of a firm, and the tougher the product market competition, the higher the disciplining power. This lim ited liability mechanism may, in part, account for the alleged disciplining power of product market competition on firm efficiency. However, even if p olicies that promote competition enhance x-efficiency, the gain may be outw eighed by a less efficient allocation of risk. Moreover, this adverse risk- effect has repercussions, implying that the effect of reduced entry barrier s on competition and consumer's welfare is small. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D20; D82; L10.