A. Ortmann et R. Squire, A game-theoretic explanation of the administrative lattice in institutionsof higher learning, J ECON BEH, 43(3), 2000, pp. 377-391
We provide a game-theoretic model of academic organizations, focusing on th
e strategic interaction of prototypical overseers, administrators, and prof
essors. By identifying key principal-agent games routinely played in colleg
es and universities, we begin to unpack the black box typically used to con
ceptualize these institutions. Our approach suggests an explanation for the
seemingly inevitable drift of institutions of higher education into such w
ell-documented phenomena as academic ratchet and administrative lattice and
builds an understanding of the organizational conditions in which drift wo
uld be restrained. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL
classification: C72; D23; D82; I21.