Much attention has recently been paid to false-memory effects in child
ren and adults. Attention initially focused on the effects themselves.
Most observers now agree that false-memory effects are robust and rep
licable, although they are subject to constraints (e.g., Lindsay 1990;
Reyna & Titcomb 1997; Zaragoza & Lane 1994; Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil, &
Chambers 1997). Using noncoercive procedures, it is possible to induce
people to falsely remember witnessing events that they never experien
ced (e.g., that they saw a yield sign, rather than a stop sign; Loftus
1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns 1978). Currently, researchers are begin
ning to examine the origins of such effects: How are false memories cr
eated, and what can be done to minimize them? It has become apparent t
hat the key questions of prediction and prevention must be addressed t
hrough theory development, i.e., by deepening our understanding of fal
se-memory phenomena. In this article, we explore contemporary explanat
ions for false-memory effects in children and adults, including constr
uctivism, source monitoring, and fuzzy-trace theory. Our discussion is
divided into four sections. In the first section, we briefly review t
he assumptions underlying different theoretical approaches. In the sec
ond section, various false-memory effects are described, and their int
eractions with age, delay, and type of questioning. Laboratory demonst
rations of false memories are supplemented by real-life examples from
clinical medicine. Then, we examine how each of these effects is expla
ined from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, we take stock o
f the available evidence favoring different explanations for false-mem
ory effects, and discuss the implications of that evidence for subsequ
ent theorizing and for improving memory performance.