Judicial auditing

This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two pr incipal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the deci sions of lower-echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In compari ng these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically disti nct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends t o bring about evenhanded review/reversal reversal, auditing for political b ias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of jurisp rudence. Our analysis also suggests that political "diversity" among initia l decision makers tin addition to its other laudable goals) may be an impor tant and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial admin istrative costs.